The Problem with Password Unmasking
2009-06-26
I disagree with this:
Even though Bruce Schneier agrees with it:
Ignoring the issue of security controls enforced differently in browsers for type password versus type text, the arguments in favor of unmasking fail to address several issues:
All that aside, the correct answer is to reduce our dependency on passwords, both through SSO technologies, and through use of certificate and ephemeral authentication schemes.
It's time to show most passwords in clear text as users type them. Providing feedback and visualizing the system's status have always been among the most basic usability principles. Showing undifferentiated bullets while users enter complex codes definitely fails to comply.
Most websites (and many other applications) mask passwords as users type them, and thereby theoretically prevent miscreants from looking over users' shoulders. Of course, a truly skilled criminal can simply look at the keyboard and note which keys are being pressed. So, password masking doesn't even protect fully against snoopers.
More importantly, there's usually nobody looking over your shoulder when you log in to a website. It's just you, sitting all alone in your office, suffering reduced usability to protect against a non-issue.
Even though Bruce Schneier agrees with it:
Shoulder surfing isn't very common, and cleartext passwords greatly reduces errors. It has long annoyed me when I can't see what I type: in Windows logins, in PGP, and so on.
Ignoring the issue of security controls enforced differently in browsers for type password versus type text, the arguments in favor of unmasking fail to address several issues:
- What class of attackers are completely foiled by password masking? What is the exposure presented by these people? (Think: someone that happens to glance at your screen as they've interrupted you midlogin)
- What is the additional level of likelihood of detection of someone trying to watch your fingers touchtype vs. someone simply reading off a screen?
- What is the additional level of risk presented by a persistent display of the password vs. an ephemeral display of each keystroke as it is typed?
- What is the additional attack surface presented by having the password sent back from a network application, rather than a one-way transmission?
- How much of the uncommonality of shoulder surfing is due to user awareness of password protection needs, as communicated to them at every login?
All that aside, the correct answer is to reduce our dependency on passwords, both through SSO technologies, and through use of certificate and ephemeral authentication schemes.